

1. The Proposal

- a. To institute covert operations within Communist-held Rumania.
- b. Such actions will be carried out by free Rumanians in the name of a Free Rumanian Council headed by King Michael.
- c. To recruit, train and infiltrate the first group of 50 agents within six months from the approval date of this project.
- d. To recruit and train in a holding area up to a total of 500 Rumanian personnel for further infiltration as these operations are developed and extended.
- e. The dispatch, supply and maintenance of such actions in Rumania must, of necessity, be carried out by air.

2. Facts Bearing on the Proposal

a. We feel that immediate steps should be taken which will permit the infiltration of 50 agents in Rumania. These agents can be best infiltrated into Rumania either from Yugoslavia or Greece depending upon relationship with and concurrence of these governments. In order to maintain security for these operations, the actual infiltration operation may have to be carried out under the guise of an industrial enterprise working within these countries. For example, the agents could be employees of an Exploration and Prospecting company which happens to be surveying in Yugoslavia and/or Greece and may have one or two geophysical parties evaluating oil or mineral prospects of territory in the north of Greece and areas in northern and northeastern Yugoslavia. Should this company be permitted to operate in these two countries, it is assumed that they would be authorized to move their material, equipment and personnel by air. This would mean the use of transport planes

such as those which may be envisaged for flights across into Rumania and other aircraft such as helicopters which may be used for initial reconnoitering in the setting up of a base in Rumania. We also have reason to believe that there are at the moment several established guerrilla strongholds in the mountains in Rumania. One of the primary objectives of covert action in Rumania will no doubt be to contact these local guerrilla strongholds, to coordinate their action if possible and to supply them with weapons and ammunition as well as any other reasonable quantities of food stuff, clothing, etc.

b. At present it is contemplated to train some 500 men in W/T, guerrilla warfare tactics, parachute jumping, security and other essential indoctrination pertaining to these operations.

c. Camp Site for Training

1. The initial lot of 20-50 agents are to be recruited from various areas where free Rumanians are available either from the present camps in Germany, those active in NCFE work or those working in private industry in the United States, Canada, Venezuela, France, Italy, etc. The recruiting job should normally be carried out by representatives of the Council assisted by a representative of the U.S. government. This latter official should operate under cover as an agent of an American Industrial Employment Agency. Those recruited from camps or large areas should be advised that they are to volunteer for industrial work which may take them to the United States, South America, North Africa or other areas, wherever suitable employment and positions can be found

for them. Those selected will then be segregated in a camp site to be established in the U. S. Zone of Germany. If such a camp site can be cleared from a security point of view, then this will make a very much more desirable location than transporting people to the United States and facing the red tape and other immigration formalities for each individual entry. Whereas a camp can be made available much easier in the United States to cover this initial indoctrination, we feel that the expense involved in bringing them over here as well as the difficulties in clearing each individual for valid entry with U. S. immigration will result in considerable delays. We therefore feel that every effort should be made to obtain a secure and suitable camp site in the U. S. Zone of Germany. Those found in U.S.A., Canada and Venezuela could be trained in U.S.A. and join the rest at the camp site in Germany prior to departure to the forwarding base.

2. In order to facilitate the training of the larger group herein envisaged for Rumania, we believe that a suitable location should be found elsewhere such as in Saudi Arabia or North Africa. We recommend Saudi Arabia because it is a large (500,000 sq. mil) country of deserts, exceedingly sparsely populated with few foreigners and where the U. S. Air Force already has an important base (at Dahran). This country's sole large industrial development is carried out by one of the largest U. S. Oil producing companies. Furthermore, this country is run by King Ibn Saud, who decides policy for his government and country. In order to obtain the proper authority to commence this indoctrination

training in Arabia it will be necessary for a top U. S. Military representative to discuss and obtain from the King permission for the entry and training of all personnel involved. In this approach we would like to recommend a military man rather than a civilian official such as the Ambassador because our experience and knowledge of the King and his government leads us to believe that the former will be more effective and desirable than the latter. This discussion will no doubt be carried out with the habitual exchanges of gifts and an offer should also be made to the King for the eventual training of Saudi Arabs. This might come in handy for the future defense of the Aramco industrial plants such as the large refinery at Ras Tanura, the Abqaiq Stabilizers, etc., in the event of a Soviet attack.

We believe that a camp site could be readily made available at Ras Mishaab with the permission of King Ibn Saud and Aramco management. This is a locality on the Persian Gulf south of the sheikdom of Kuwait. There is a very small fishing village with this name and the camp which is recommended for this work belongs to the Arabian American Oil Company. This place was used as the terminal for the unloading of most of the pipe used in the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line. As you know, this line (1080 miles of 30"-31") has already been completed to Sidon (Syria) and the camp buildings and other constructions at Ras Mishaab could, within a very short period, be adequately transformed to fit the requirements of the proposed training camp-site. Ras Mishaab is connected with asphalt highways to Dahrán where the Arabian U. S. Air

Force base is located. This distance can be covered in about three hours by car or in less than one hour by plane. There is a fairly good air strip at Ras Mishaab and daily flights are already scheduled by Aramco between Dahran and Beirut in Syria. We believe commercial airlines land in Dahran (T.W.A. & others) at least three times weekly. In addition, Aramco flies its own planes twice a week from Dahran to New York via Athens or Rome. Consequently it may be reasonable to conclude that with the King's permission to train free Rumanians and other nationalities from behind the Iron Curtain in Ras Mishaab, easy communications by air could be maintained with the proposed forwarding base in Greece. Up to the present the King has been somewhat reluctant in authorizing Aramco to employ, in addition to Arabs, other personnel than Americans and Italians. Foreigners are rarely admitted into Saudi Arabia and the King has recently made the entry even of British citizens very difficult.

Security-wise Saudi Arabia should make an excellent country for training purposes. We believe that a camp-site at Ras Mishaab could be easily guarded, whilst correspondence from the trainees to their relatives abroad could be closely scrutinized.

The selection of an alternate site for a camp in North Africa should however be pursued at the same time, since it may be necessary to have an alternate training base in North Africa in the event that Saudi Arabia falls to the Soviets.

D. Forwarding Base

Although a main forwarding base for Rumanian operations should be set up in Greece, "advance" forwarding bases may have to be set up in

both Yugoslavia and Turkey. It would be most desirable to be able to have an "advance" forwarding base located somewhere in the vicinity of **Vrsac (Yugoslavia)**. This would enable the operation of modern aircraft such as helicopters at pre-dawn hours into Rumania bases and thus be over Rumanian territory maximum of 30-45 minutes. At the same time, with the concurrence of the Yugoslav government for this type of covert operations to be launched from Yugoslavian territory, the infiltration by foot across the Yugoslav border could be more easily accomplished. This would simplify the establishment of a number of bases or strongholds in the mountains in northwest and southwest Rumania, which will be most beneficial to the Yugoslavs in the event of a war and particularly in the pre-attack phase. We recommend that every effort be made to obtain Yugoslavia's concurrence for use of an "advance" forwarding base for operations in Rumania. Later in this project we will outline how we believe it can be done.

An advance base in Turkey is recommended for operations destined to establish one or more bases in the **Danube Delta**. The infiltration of the agents in Rumania from the Turkish territory would, under the present circumstances, appear most logical to be carried out from the Black Sea.

The main base to be established in Greece will have to be cleared by the Greek government and, as proposed above, be carried out under the name and auspices of American Industrial enterprise. We have selected exploration and prospecting as the type of work to be carried out by this enterprise because it can more easily justify the type of work contemplated

and the transportation of material, equipment and personnel to the various points of operation. An adequate air strip should be provided near this forwarding base somewhere in the vicinity of Salonica in the northern part of Greece. This area is over 200 miles closer than Athens to the target area. This forwarding base should be made security-proof and have sufficient warehouse space to accommodate the required number of guns, rifles, transport units, ammunition, etc. for a total of 15,000 guerrilla fighters. In time, as and when more guns and ammunition are available, this number could be correspondingly increased.

We recommend that immediate consideration be given for the selection of a suitable site for the construction of a radio transmitting station in the vicinity of the forwarding base near Salonica. This black radio station should direct its broadcasts to Rumania on medium or long wave, whichever is found most suitable to existing receiving sets in Rumania. The throw-away radio possibilities should be investigated. Propaganda operations should also be launched from this base. This would involve flights over Rumania for the purpose of dropping leaflets. It is therefore contemplated that at this forwarding base sufficient housing be made available to house various groups of agents who are to be flown into Rumania as well as the permanent operational headquarters, personnel required to handle radio station, propaganda work, pilots and ground crews. Another site for a forwarding base should also be established in North Africa. This will be needed in the event the Soviets attack and occupy Greece.

Discussion

A. Initial Operations

After this project has been approved, immediate measures for putting it into operation must be carried out. This first phase of the initial operations must cover the listing, selecting, recruiting and processing of the first lot of 20-50 free Rumanians who will be directly engaged in the proposed initial operation. The responsibility of listing, screening and recruiting of the free Rumanians abroad should by right rest with the National Council of Free Rumanians. It is the duty of this Council to appoint qualified and experienced representatives at various points in the United States, France, Italy, Germany, the Argentine and Canada where complete registration lists of free Rumanians should be compiled. From these lists certain elements that are worthy of selection should be first screened closely for security by the Rumanian Council. Among those selected should there still remain one or two dubious elements, these will no doubt be found out at the second screening which will be executed by this agency prior to processing the recruits for training.

We recommend that in certain areas where Free Rumanians live in camps collectively (Germany, Austria and France) it would be advisable to follow a definite procedure of recruitment. We firmly believe that those selected as possible candidates be called together and asked to volunteer for industrial work abroad (outside of Germany). Those willing to do so shall then be individually interrogated by the Council representatives and the U. S. agent for the American Industrial Employment Agency

as outlined above. Through tactful and close questioning, the two representatives should be in a position in a very short time to make up their minds whether the volunteer free Rumanian can be and is willing to be employed in covert operations in Rumania. In the event that he agrees to participate in this type operation, he qualifies for further training, hardship tests, etc., he should be informed concerning the remuneration he will receive and what benefits may be paid to his widow in the event of his decease. It should be clearly pointed out to each individual volunteer the risks pertaining to such operations. After the volunteers have been properly processed, they should be introduced one by one into a room where the ceremony of swearing in shall be officiated. Each man will take an oath of allegiance to King Michael and free Rumania in a proper and formal ceremony similar to the swearing in procedure in pre-Communist Rumania. A Rumanian priest and a high ranking free Rumanian officer should officiate under the Rumanian colors. The oath of allegiance should be carefully worded and studied by members of Council before final approval by King Michael. The sworn-in agents should then proceed without any loss of time to the training center selected.

B. Training

The first lot of 20-50 agents so processed should be gathered together in a secluded camp-site somewhere in U. S. Zone of Germany or U.S., as the case may be, and undergo proper training for the various assignments which they will receive in connection with the future covert operations in Rumania. This training should be as comprehensive as

possible and embrace the following:

1. Motivation--formulation of team spirit, confidence.
2. Security--individual and group
 - a. Procedures to be followed under interrogation
 - b. Cover stories
 - c. Cryptographic procedures
3. Cryptography--coding and decoding.
4. Radio operation and maintenance.
5. Secret writing procedures.
6. Marksmanship and care of weapons and equipment
7. Guerrilla tactics
8. First Aid
9. Demolitions and sabotage
10. Parachute training
11. Camouflage and use of terrain
12. Commando tactics and silent killing
13. Personnel inspection of accoutrements prior to mission
14. Detailed briefing on:
 - a. Target area briefing by local experienced instructors
 - b. Current conditions in Rumania
 - c. Prices of commodities and cost of living
 - d. New currency
 - e. Identity cards and documents required by Militia
 - f. Soviet and Rumanian security controls
 - g. New uniforms and ranks
 - h. Communist officials in government and in local area
 - i. Elementary knowledge of Russian idioms

15. Tests to determine courage, stability and endurance under tense conditions.

At the end of the training course examinations should be taken by participants. The agents should be advised at the commencement of the training period that ^{group} leaders will be selected from among them who will have distinguished themselves during the training period and have passed their examinations with high marks. Due credit will also be given those who have had previous experience in underground work, imprisonment and clandestine escape action. Those members who, although security-proof, are found to be inapt for covert operations, during the training period, shall be assigned to work at the forwarding base or training camps.

C. Organization

The organization should be divided along the following lines:

- (a) recruiting office;
- (b) training staff;
- (c) forwarding base personnel;
- (d) operational personnel.

The recruiting, training and forwarding base personnel shall follow the orthodox set-up for this type of organization. The recommended first operational group contemplated for Rumania is a party of ten people. The chief of this party is to be selected by the agency in line with his background experience and results of training. The chief of the party should receive the rank of Colonel in the free Rumanian army and should have the pay equivalent to such rank in the U.S. Army. His duties shall be to reach the objectives given to him prior to his departure and lead his mission to success. As chief of the party he will assign each member

to his task and be responsible for the execution thereof. He shall maintain discipline among the party and take all necessary measures for the security of his establishment and personnel. He shall maintain current contact by radio or other means with the forwarding base and receive instructions regarding his subsequent moves. In other words, the chief of the party shall be in control of, responsible for and have full authority over the group of agents that will be launched with him on this first venture.

The chief will select from his group two assistants. One will be in charge of all supplies and logistics and administratively see that the party is fed and properly taken care of. He shall be in charge of all finance of the party and distribute funds and rations according to requirements.

The second assistant will act as chief of staff of party operations. It will be his duty to send out scouts, contact nearby villages and appraise the strength of the opposition in the neighborhood. The operational assistant will aid the party chief in formulating messages back to the forwarding base. These two assistants should have the rank of Major in the free Rumanian army and shall be paid the salary paid to majors in the U.S. Army.

The party will have two radio operators of which the top radio operator should be a male and have the rank of Captain, while his assistant may be a woman and have the rank of Lieutenant. She would also act as the nurse for the party and must have had first aid training experience.

The radio operators will be responsible at all times for the maintenance and good shape of their instruments and will endeavor to their best ability to keep contact at all times with the forwarding base. It may be necessary for the radio operators also to maintain contact with the aircrafts supplying the stronghold base in Rumania.

Three other men shall be selected from the party to act as scouts. It shall be the duty of these scouts to prod the neighborhood for opposition, to determine the attitude of the neighboring villages, to maintain friendly relations with the local population, to contact the local guerrilla bands and to select secondary bases for future operations. In selecting these sites care should be taken to establish a line of escape towards the nearest friendly border. The scouts shall also have the rank of Captain and shall be similarly paid as those having same rank in the U.S. Army.

The party shall comprise also one ground mechanic who will be familiar with the operation of a helicopter and its maintenance. The mechanic should also be versed with electrical instruments so that may assist with repairs of weapons and equipment that have become inoperative. The mechanic should have the rank of Master Sergeant.

The tenth man in the party shall act as cook, housekeeper and general handy man of the camp. He is to have the rank of Sergeant.

D. Planning of Initial Drops

After the initial lot of 20-50 agents will have been recruited, processed and trained, the first party of ten men will assemble at the

forwarding base in Greece and be prepared to be launched into Rumania. The time taken to cover these phases should be approximately three months from the approval of the project.

In order to establish a base in Rumania under optimum conditions we recommend very strongly that an advance forwarding base in Yugoslavia be utilized. To establish an advance forwarding base in Yugoslavia it is necessary to obtain (a) the concurrence of the Yugoslav government for the launching of covert operations from their territory to other countries behind the Iron Curtain. This will prove most beneficial to the Yugoslavs in the event of aggression from the Soviets or its satellites.

(b) In the event that this solution is not feasible, then we recommend that authorization be obtained from the Yugoslavian government for the formation of a company in Yugoslavia which shall be a subsidiary of an American exploration and Prospecting company and which will have as its objective a thorough survey of the oil and mineral prospects of northern and northeastern Yugoslavia. In order to carry out such work, this exploration and prospecting company shall be permitted to have its specialized personnel brought into the country and flown by helicopter from one place of operation to another. This work could normally be carried out by one of the exploration and prospecting companies in the United States (such as [] and who could provide adequate cover for infiltrating other parties that we contemplate sending into the countries behind the Iron Curtain. We believe that the use of helicopters may prove to be extremely beneficial in establishing bases for

covert operations and then subsequently maintain contacts between these same bases and permit the over-all chief of operations for that particular country to better coordinate his planning and effective sabotage work by personal inspections, liaison with other groups, etc. The helicopter has been used in recent years for prospecting and exploration work in countries where the terrain does not permit accessibility to automotive vehicles.

The launching of a ten man party without a reception committee on the ground or exact knowledge of the chosen site for the base does not provide optimum conditions of success. We recommend that a smaller party be flown in from an advance forwarding base in Yugoslavia by helicopter on a dark night at one hour or so previous to daybreak. This group should consist of a pilot, the chief of the party, his operational assistant and a radio man. We consider that the first location of our base in Rumania should be situated somewhere on one of the isolated and inaccessible peaks of the Apuseni Mts. which in our opinion is the ideal locality to commence operations. This area is populated by the "Motzi", which is one of the hardest and bravest tribes of the Transylvanian province of Rumania. At the same time we feel it is absolutely essential that nearby this landing point in the mountains there should be sufficient forested land to permit a cover from daylight air reconnaissance and possible air attack. We recommend that after the landing of the small group with the helicopter at the chosen site, the men first give their attention to camouflaging the helicopter and secondly, proceed with caution to reconnoiter the proposed site for the base. This survey should

be carried out with great caution and an exact appraisal should be made of the attitude of the local population encountered in the neighboring villages, and the relative strength and movements of the Communist Militia in that area. Attention should be paid that the information obtained from the local population should be checked and re-checked for reliability.

Should the landing spot be found to be insecure or present certain aspects which may jeopardize the success of the mission, then the party chief could advise the forwarding base in Greece that he is not satisfied with this site and propose for study some other location. The party chief could either go back with his small group to the advance forwarding base in Yugoslavia and from there proceed to Greece, or could, upon instructions received from his headquarters, remain in Rumania and proceed to a secondary or third choice location as instructed.

In the event that the first landing site is acceptable from all points of view, then the party chief will recommend to his headquarters that they drop the remaining seven men of the original ten-man party and proceed to the establishment of the base on the original site selected. Upon agreement with headquarters, the four men, including the pilot, at the site shall form the reception committee and direct the aircraft by lights and radio thus permitting the other seven to land in optimum conditions. This procedure appears to us to present a better guarantee for success than the launching in the dark of the ten-man party without any previous survey or reconnaissance of the site chosen for the first base.

(c) In the event that the Yugoslavs will not accept the offer of

the American group to prospect Yugoslavian territory without cost to the government and thus the agency will not have available this vehicle from which to launch its small survey group, then the Yugoslav government may be approached by the U.S. Air Forces to permit them to have an emergency landing strip somewhere in eastern Yugoslavia. Should this be accepted then friendly relations should be developed between U. S. personnel at this strip and Yugoslavian local officials to permit one dark night the arrival, refueling and departure of a helicopter destined for covert operations in Rumania, as outlined above. This may imply bribery and closing of eyes of Yugoslavian officials.

(d) Should all these various proposals be objected to by the Yugoslavs, then we recommend that consideration be given to the flight of a transport aircraft towing in a helicopter from Greece. We feel very strongly that the chosen site should be first surveyed by a small group with a helicopter as has already been described and therefore believe that every effort should be made to employ this type of aircraft in future covert operations. If flown in from Yugoslavia, the helicopter need not fly more than 45-60 minutes over Rumanian territory and therefore, at that hour of the night, should not awaken any suspicion of the eventual guards and attention of the local rural population. In the event the towing of a helicopter is not feasible, we recommend that the original base be first reconnoitered by a two-man party to be infiltrated by foot or air as conditions permit.

Assuming that the first base has been established and that necessary authority has been obtained for the carrying out of the plan as recom-

mended above, the party chief in the field shall then assign one of his scouts to the reconnoitering of the surrounding areas for the purpose of selecting a second base. As the second base may be 40-60 miles away from the original base, it may take as much as two to three weeks before another site can be properly surveyed and selected. Upon the scout's return to his first base, he shall discuss with the operational chief and the chief of the party his report and then shall proceed in a small group together with a radio operator in the helicopter to fly to the chosen location and have it surveyed and verified for final O.K. by the chief of the party. This should be done in one or two days and then proper signals be sent out to the forwarding base in Greece so that the second ten-man party can be dropped in at the new selected site. Here again the small group which acted as a reception committee for first landing will direct the aircraft according to instructions. Then the helicopter and first party crew may return to original base.

It must be realized that in carrying out covert operations in Rumania from a forwarding base in Greece, one must of necessity cross either Bulgaria or Yugoslavia in order to reach the proposed landing spot in Rumania. By the use of the helicopter at an advance forwarding base in Yugoslavia, the period of flight over enemy territory is considerably curtained and therefore the possibility of detection by the enemy reduced to a minimum.

For the establishment of a third, fourth and other subsequent bases the same procedure should be followed as outlined above for the establishment and selection of the original and second base. We recommend that at

least one helicopter be maintained at all times in the field and used for personal contacts of party chiefs and headquarters representatives and also as an instrument of escape in extreme circumstances when some of party leaders may be under direct threat or danger of capture. Fuel supplies for the helicopter shall be flown in with other supplies.

We estimate that, by the use of helicopters between bases and eventual guerrilla band leaders of existing strongholds in Rumania, considerable time shall be saved and within a period of, say, six months from approval of this project there should be at least four or five bases established in Rumania located astride the four important rail and road communications that connect the western part of Rumania with Hungary and Yugoslavia. These are: 1. Cluj -- Oradia Mare

2. Brasov -- Arad

3. Craiova--Timisoara

4. Orsova --Turnu Severin (Iron Gates).

E. Extension of Operations

Assuming that 4-5 bases have been established in western Rumania, astride the main lines of communications leading out of Rumania, further operational objectives should be approached. We believe that operational bases should then be established on the Carpathians all the way across Rumania to Brasov and eventually north of Buzau. By following the same tactics as we assume will have been successfully accomplished in western Rumania, the Carpathian bases should not present any new major problems.

On our approach eastward towards Brasov we are naturally moving

nearer to more industrial centers and more thickly populated areas. Although these provide, under certain circumstances, better security they at the same time receive closer attention from Communist Militia and Soviet controls. When, moving southwards and east from Transylvania one may receive less friendly cooperation on the part of the local population since these are more often patrolled and therefore subjected to stricter and closer investigation from Militia and Communist party spies.

After a series of bases across the Carpathians has been established to, let us say, Brasov, we should proceed with an infiltration line across the length of the Danube from Turnu-Severin to the mouth of the Danube Delta at Sulina. This line of individual infiltration should then be tied into the proposed base to be established from the advance forwarding base in Turkey for the Danube Delta area. Further, another line of bases could be established along the northern boundary of Rumania tying into the Carpathian Mts. in north Moldova around Piatru-Neamtz. This line would be from Oradia to Baia-Mare--Nasaud--Campulung and Piatru-Neamtz. Thus, time permitting, we could establish another line between north Moldova and Galati across the Prut River right on the Soviet border.

Further, we recommend that individual infiltration from the Brasov base should be maneuvered to the south into the industrial area of Rumania towards Floesti and Bucharest and a similar movement could also be started northwards from Giurgiu on the Danube. In this way in approximately 18 months to two years the whole of Rumania could be covered by a set of operational bases and infiltrations from which we could commence large-scale sabotage work and guerrilla warfare.

F. Initial Operational Objectives

The primary objectives of the initial landing party in Rumania should be to evaluate as accurately as possible the attitude of the local population surrounding the base and their desire to assist the group in its covert actions. At the same time it should study the Communist and Militia movements in that area and evaluate the opposition that the group may expect to encounter within certain periods of time.

Another objective would be to seek and contact already established guerrilla bands in the mountains and endeavor to supply them, if possible, with funds, ammunition, weapons, food stuffs, clothing, etc. These groups should then be coordinated into the general plan of covert operations for the whole of Rumania.

One of the primary objectives, which we have already discussed, ~~it is~~ is to establish further bases and at the same time organize an escape route to the nearest friendly border.

G. Sabotage Work

Assuming that the attitude of the population encountered is friendly, and assuming that they are prepared to assist in covert guerrilla action and sabotage work, then careful consideration shall be given to the training of the locals for the kind of sabotage work contemplated. Since women are generally employed in Rumania for all type of heavy work even that of working in the fields, no one ever questions women dressed in peasant clothes seen walking between villages at any time of day or night. We suggest here that serious consideration be given to the employment of

women in effective scouting work between and within villages where Soviet troops or militia squads may at an appropriate time be drawn into ambushes. Children should also be taught to deflate tires and any other work which, although it may appear inoffensive, may contribute to harass and impede the mobility of the opposition. We further recommend that Russians' craze for drink should be more fully studied and their weakness exploited to the utmost. In other words, we suggest that "Tzuica" and "Rachiu" (strong local plum brandy) be bought in casks from peasants, treated and vated, then bottled and distributed to local friendly population for sale to Soviet troops. Other devices, time bombs, etc. should in time be supplied by the agency for demolition work and the population properly indoctrinated that they may use these with success.

To encourage execution of such work by natives, gifts or money should be given to them. Such gifts as nylon wear, medicine, thread and needles for women, candy for the children, cigarettes for the grown-ups, etc. are recommended.

All of the groups infiltrated in Rumania should be properly indoctrinated as to the use of high explosives, the destruction of ammunition trains, oil products tank-car trains, blowing up of important industrial enterprises and key railway junctions, bridges, etc., The important point to remember is the proper timing of such sabotage work and the coordination of one group with the work carried out by another group 50 or 60 miles away. The damaging then of the main lines of communication in the west of Roumania at a time when Soviet troop movements occupy the full volume of traffic on these lines, may paralyze and create a tremendous bottleneck

in the mobility of these troops westwards. Until repairs are carried out the troops will remain blocked for some days and will become an easy target for allied bombing.

H. Preparation for War-Time Objectives

If after a period of six months from the approval of this project no major difficulties and delays are encountered in the execution of the proposed operation, then we should be in a position to again consider what we may now call "long term" objectives or those which will be paramount in our minds in the event of a war between the Soviets and the rest of the world. Assuming that we have succeeded in establishing these bases in the western part of Rumania in the next six months, this will give us an excellent opportunity to tie in to the existing guerrilla strongholds in Rumania and supply them with necessary requirements for more serious guerrilla warfare work. Assuming that a force of 20,000-30,000 non-Communist Rumanians is assembled, and prepared to fight either Communist Militia or the Soviets, we will have created within Rumania a strong bastion of opposition. It is estimated that at least 5 to 6 times this number of Soviet troops will be required to subdue these brave and resourceful anti-Communist guerrillas. Although operations for large-scale sabotage work and guerrilla warfare tactics should be ready for action some time during the latter part of this year, we feel that we cannot sufficiently emphasize the importance of properly timing the commencement of this type of warfare without fully considering all of the consequences, which may result in an untimely suppression of our established bases. An impulsive

act on the part of some of the groups or guerrilla bands may uncover a complete area to the Communists and may lead to eventual discovery of the other bases in advance of our presently envisaged expectations. Although excellent opportunities may present themselves for ambushing some isolated Soviet or militia troops passing by in the neighborhood, such action should not be taken without proper instruction from headquarters. To initiate action ahead of preparation for commencement of this type of operation may result in the destruction of the bases and endanger lives of the groups.

I. Corollary Problems

1. Psychological Warfare

Concomitant with the establishment of bases for covert operations in Rumania, it is important that serious and immediate consideration be given to developing psychological warfare directed against the Communists in Rumania. After the establishment of these bases, word will no doubt be spread around by the local population all over Rumania of their existence which will have an immediate effect of bolstering up the morale of the people and will tend to accelerate their expectations and prayers for an early liberation of Rumania from the Soviet and Communist yoke.

Consideration should be given to the advisability of dropping leaflets in Rumania prior to the establishment of a base so that the local population may be expecting friends to come in and help them in their fight against the Communists. We believe that it may be more

advisable and wiser to retard this action until two or more bases have already been set up and until a line of escape from these bases to the border has been established by links in every village traversed. By alerting the population prior to the establishment of the bases, we will no doubt also alert the opposition, and may make our task more difficult in the establishment of our bases. Up and until the present greater pressure has been placed on Rumania for its Sovietization than any other of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. By establishing free Rumanian bases in the mountains of western Rumania we are treading on delicate ground and cannot at this stage anticipate or foresee the reaction of the Soviets. Therefore, we would recommend that leaflets be dropped advising the population that assistance is coming in to help them after a few bases have been established.

Undoubtedly some of the broadcasts of the free Europe program and some of the Voice of America broadcasts are listened to by quite a few Rumanians in the hope that they may grasp some information as to early liberation of their country. We believe and recommend that intensive propaganda by means of a "black" radio be instituted as soon as this plan is approved with a radio station in the vicinity of our proposed forwarding base in Greece. From Greece the free Rumanians assigned to this radio work, will be in a position to listen daily to the Bucharest Communist radio broadcasts and pick up any points which will be useful in countering the false propaganda spread by the official Communist station. This powerful "Black" radio directed to Rumania from Greece,

whether on a long or medium wave, will no doubt be subjected to jamming in certain areas of the country but according to past experience they will be unable to extend this all over Rumania. Consideration should also be given to the dropping of throw away radios to the local population. It is very gratifying that quite a good many free Rumanians now in the United States have had opportunity to receive proper training and indoctrination as to the making up of programs directed to Rumania under the auspices of the National Committee for a Free Europe. These people will no doubt prove very helpful in setting up and running the black radio program with the assistance of U. S. technicians. Attempts should also be made to shadow broadcasts or inject adverse ghost talk into the Communist broadcasts emitted from Bucharest.

In addition to the black radio, consideration should be given to the dropping in of leaflets and posters in various parts of Rumania. One of the primary objectives of the black radio should be to uncover the Communist "bullies" and threaten any further Communist crimes with measures of retaliation. Once bases in Rumania have been established, it will be easier to carry out threats made by radio and, in fact, carry out acts of reprisals against Communist leaders and those threatened. Information shall be collected from all possible sources emanating from Roumania and from those recently out of the country, in order to piece together the pattern and set up of as many Communist organizations and towns as possible. In this way we will have correct information as to the Communist leaders in various towns and follow up their doings. Should a Communist official

or Militia chief embark on a terror campaign against the local population in some areas, then both by radio and by leaflets we could uncover him, threaten him and actually abduct him and leave his body exposed in the "Red Square" of the village or town.

2. Economic Warfare.

At an appropriate time all measures should be taken to carry out economic warfare against the Communist-run industries in Rumania. It is a well-known and established fact that most of the industrial out-put of Rumania is directed towards Russia and her satellites. A slowing up of this industrial out-put may defer certain deliveries which will no doubt affect Soviet over-all planning. A program of economic warfare to be undertaken from our established bases in Rumania should be carefully planned and studied at this time and put in application whenever it is tactically feasible.

J. Mechanism

In order to have the best chances of success for the carrying out of these operations and to obtain the full support of the rural population in our common fight against Communism and the Soviets for the liberation of Rumania, we again assert that the only leader who could successfully cement the unity among the free Rumanians abroad and at the same time could raise the morale of the Rumanian population and obtain their assistance in the accomplishment of our objectives, is King Michael. King Michael should have a staff of advisers made up of former Rumanian dignitaries or other distinguished Rumanians on whom he may call for expert advice. We recommend that this staff be termed National

Council of Free Rumanians or any other title acceptable to all parties concerned. In our original proposal and in this project we have outlined several duties for the Council members to perform and which should be the responsibility of those free Rumanian leaders under King Michael. In the past in Rumania we have lived through certain experiences which we would like to avoid in the political aftermath of this new war. At the time of the overthrow of Carol II, political credit for his overthrow was taken by the legionnaires because of their ability to put in the streets of Bucharest several thousand youngsters who clamored for the abdication of Carol. It is a well-known fact, however, that Carol was forced to abdicate through a series of circumstances which had been initiated and controlled up until his abdication by the leaders of the Rumanian democracy.

In other words, it should be clearly understood that the best chances of successfully accomplishing our mission is to carry out these operations under the name of King Michael and that he should have a council at his side to act upon as advisers to him and to our effective operations.

These men, irrespective of their political parties, are embarked in this operation in the name of their King and for the early liberation of their enslaved country--Rumania.

INSERT 1.

In other words, the over-all purpose of this action is to rally under King Michael all anti-Communist Rumanians to actively support, participate and assist in immediate covert operations during the present cold war stage in Rumania and later engage in open guerrilla warfare upon outbreak of hostilities.

INSERT 2.

From Soviet past experience we know that mass deportation has often been carried out to clear up an area infested by guerrilla bands and to destroy the active link between the rural population and the resistance movement. We foresee that at some future date the Soviets in conjunction with the local Rumanian militia may adopt such tactics and endeavor to subdue all resistance movement in the western mountains by cutting off their contact with the nearby villages and towns in the plains area. To carry out such deportation the rural population has to be rounded up and segregated in camps from where they can be transported by rail to U.S.S.R. From past experience we believe that rumors or news of this move will get out several days ahead of actual date when such action is to be taken and in most cases this may permit warning the population that they should immediately proceed to such or such an escape base in the mountains. Further directions will then have to be given for these groups to be reorganized under some guerrilla leaders on such or such mountain or forest. All available means of transportation and foodstuff supplies from nearby villages not included in the envisaged deportation should be made available for the use of those escaping.

INSERT 3 -- page 20--second paragraph--line 6 "... Danube Delta area."

In the event of hostilities between U.S.S.R. and Turkey, Soviet troops and equipment will have to move by land from Rumania either across the Danube by way of Rusciuc and Silistra or from Tulcea by rail through Medgidia to Negru-Voda. The only other alternative would be to transport Soviet troops and materials by sea.

To harass, retard, impede and prevent large Soviet troop concentrations and their progress south and eastwards from Rumania into Bulgaria must be one of our main objectives. After establishing bases in the Danube Delta and through extensive infiltrations across the Danube from Turnu-Severin to Galati, we shall then proceed further to penetrate the Dobroja region in order that we may control the Medgidia and Negru-Voda railroad. This will provide strong positions for our operations against Soviet troop movements in their advance southwards towards the Turkish border.

The controlling point of railroad traffic eastward from Bucharest and south from Buzau is the railroad bridge across the Danube between Fetesti and Cernavoda. The other route to the southeast from Russia is from Ismail across the Danube to Tulcea, and then by rail across Dobroja through Medgidia to Negru-Voda. By destroying the railroad bridge in Fetesti and continuing harassing actions between Medgidia and Negru-Voda, we will hamper any rapid advances of the Soviet troops to the south.

INSERT 4.

Militia

For brevity in this project we have employed the term "militia" to embrace all types of police operating in urban and rural centers of Communist Rumania. This comprises the "Siguranta" or security police, the "Jandarmerie" which is the rural military police, the "Granicerii" which covers the frontier police guards, and recently established "labor" camp guards. The employment of this term "militia" by the Communist Rumanians is similar to the practice used in the U.S.S.R. where "militia" embraces all types of police and security organs.

INSERT 5. (last page second line "...concerned.")

The Council of Free Rumanians will therefore act as the main link with
the Rumanian people.

INSERT 6. Page 20 - third paragraph - "Danube"

We consider that a special infiltration group should close in on the oil fields area north, west and east of Ploesti. In the event of hostilities with the U.S.S.R., Ploesti, which is one of the largest refining centers in Europe, will as in the last war again be a most vulnerable target. We believe that the group of technicians running the oil fields, refinery and pipe lines out of Ploesti and the surrounding fields is mostly made up of non-Communist elements who have been obliged to accept the regime in order that they may exist. Our present information is that they are boycotting to the best of their efforts any new oil field development in this area and are anxiously awaiting the return of their principals from abroad. (American, British, French, Belgian, etc.) We have reason to believe that we have many friends among this group and the people in these areas and will find much easier adequate protection and cover for our infiltration group. At the appropriate time considerable damage can be done to the crude oil production and products processed in the Ploesti region. The pipe lines and tank-car trains leading out of Ploesti are most vulnerable points for intelligent sabotage workers.

INSERT 7: - Page 23 - under "H" after line 5.

Rumania is the most important nerve center for any Soviet attacks either westwards into Yugoslavia or southwards through Bulgaria into Turkey. By the successful establishment of our bases and infiltration astride the four important rail and road communications leading west as well as by infiltrations surrounding the important industrial areas in the center of Rumania around Brasov and then again south towards Ploesti and Bucharest, we should create strong possibilities to effectively retard, harrass, impede and destroy Soviet troop movements in their advance towards Yugoslavia.

At the same time by establishing bases in the Danube Delta and extending infiltrations southwards through Dobroja to the Bulgarian frontier, we should likewise be in a position to seriously delay and damage Soviet troop movements destined for the operations and attack on Turkey. Similarly, by intelligent and aggressive infiltrations astride the Danube River from Turnu-Severin to Galati, all pontoon bridges across the Danube at various points into Bulgaria could be controlled and therefore become vulnerable targets to our attack. This would impede progress of Soviet troops across Bulgaria for any attack they might have in mind either against Greece in the southwest corner of Bulgaria or against Turkey in the southeast.

The industrial output of Communist Rumania is at present directed towards the U.S.S.R. and in the event of a war will no doubt be entirely

integrated into the Soviet war machine. By intelligent penetration of our agents into the Rumanian Communist working classes, we could prepare the ground for eventual sabotage work. At the right signal when the industrial production capacity of Rumania has been transformed for war purposes, then these centers will become a major target for our large-scale sabotage and demolition work.

It is a well-known fact that the Soviets have always considered Rumania as the launching base of any of their operations in an attack against Yugoslavia, Greece or Turkey. The occupation of Rumania by over a million Soviet troops during the 1944-47 period has certainly contributed in a large way to the establishment of the Communist political regime and power. The pressure exerted by the Soviets and the brazen overt actions by which the Soviet established the Communists in power in Rumania again confirms our belief that Rumania represents for the U.S.S.R. the most important, but vulnerable, pivotal point in their war strategy and planning.

Therefore, we cannot stress sufficiently the importance of concentrating our efforts in an endeavor to establish bases and infiltrations across Rumania as soon as possible.

INSERT 8. Under "Objectives"

Infiltration into the Communist Party

One of the objectives of the covert actions in Rumania should be to gradually infiltrate into the Communist party. It is a well-known fact that only a very small percentage of those registered in the Communist party are real Communists at heart. If Rumanians were to survive, they had to be accepted into some labor camp in Rumania. Only those within the labor camps of Rumania receive food coupons, clothing rations and free mails daily at the State-run canteens. These meals represent the mainstay of their existence. Most of these non-Communist elements that have nevertheless joined up with the Communist party and occupy some minor role within it, could be tactfully approached by our agents and at an appropriate time encouraged to begin to take a keener interest in the party movements and play a more important role within the policy-making group of the party. We believe that with proper persuasion and with our concurrence we may be in a position to gradually push several of our non-Communist friends, that are today obscure members of the party, into the higher-ranking and key positions of the organization. Contacts of this nature may prove to be very valuable as they will provide more reliable sources of information and better control as to important moves decided by the Communist leaders. In time of war such advance information and forewarning will no doubt prove of considerable value to us.

INSERT 9.

Before landing the first party in Rumania, the party chief should be given two or three sites where he may locate alternate bases in the event the first base is insecure or presents unforeseen hazards.

INSERT 10.

One of the duties of the party chief should be to determine the extent on which he may depend for local food supplies and how this could be increased in time. Elsewhere we have discussed the importance of trading in certain wares such as medicine, nylons, cigarettes, etc. in exchange for basic foodstuffs such as wheat, corn, milk, cheese, etc. A reliable source of supply from the local population will save considerable air transportation from the forwarding base and eliminate some of the breakage etc. which is inherent to the dropping operations.